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Abstract 
In this paper we propose a method for moni-
toring bottlenecks in price coordination within the 
marketing channel. First, a conceptual framework 
for price relationships in food marketing channels is 
developed. Then a vector error-correction model is 
proposedas a measurement instrument for monitor-
ing price coordination in the food chain. An appli-
cation to the marketing channel of pork in the Neth-
erlands is provided. One of the conclusions is that if 
piglet prices show changes that cannot be explained 
by changes in pig, wholesale or retail prices, then 
breeders are not able to bring piglet prices back into 
line with the prices of the downstream stages in the 
chain without forcing the downstream stages to 
change their prices. This situation may hinder pork-
chain members to conduct a joint consumer-driven 
marketing operation. 
1. Introduction 
This paper is concerned with bottlenecks in 
marketing channels of agricultural and food prod-
ucts. Bottlenecks in a marketing channel are defined 
as impediments at a particular stage of the marketing 
channel to adapt to changes in marketing variables, 
such as changes in customer wants and needs or 
changes in prices. Bottlenecks in the food marketing 
chain can result from shortcomings in market trans-
parency and in the capacity or willingness of channel 
members to adapt to market changes. 
Since we focus on adaptation to price 
changes, we consider bottlenecks that result from 
price coordination behaviour. This subject has been 
fundamentally discussed in the industrial economics 
theory (e.g. Tirole, 1988; Martin, 1993). The rela-
tionship between farm prices and consumer food 
prices has been extensively investigated in the vast 
literature on marketing margins (e.g. Berck and 
Rauser, 1982; Briz and De Felipe, 1997). This paper 
tackles a specific topic in this field. It tries to de-
velop a method for monitoring the quality of price 
coordination in agricultural marketing channels. 
Such methods seem indispensable for spotting short-
comings in channel performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 
2 a conceptual framework for price relationships in 
food marketing channels is developed. In Section 3 
vector error-correction modelling is proposed as a 
measurement instrument for monitoring price coor-
dination in the food chain. In Section 4 this instru-
ment is applied to the pork marketing chain in the 
Netherlands. In Section 5 the main conclusions are 
summarized and directions for further research are 
proposed. 
2. Models 
Price coordination in marketing channels aims 
at relating product prices at various stages of the 
marketing channel in such a way that the channel is 
performing well. It implies that product price 
changes at a particular stage of the channel, ceteris 
paribus, influence prices in other stages of the mar-
keting channel. The extent of price coordination in 
the channel, and for that matter the absence of bot-
tlenecks, depends on the price strategy of the respec-
tive channel companies. Therefore, monitoring a 
marketing channel for price coordination might 
profit from a conceptual framework of companies' 
price strategy vis â vis changing purchase prices. We 
suggest the following hierarchy in price coordination 
as a framework for monitoring bottlenecks in pric-
ing. As a matter of convenience, we assume in our 
presentation a three-level marketing channel, e.g. 
producer, wholesaler and retailer, referred to as com-
panies 1,2 and 3 respectively, but our results can be 
generalized to a/>-level channel. 
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' 'Adhoc'price coordination', price changes are co-
ordinated only in case of substantial price changes. 
In this situation companies fix their price without 
considering 'modest' price changes by other compa-
nies in the channel: 
(la) 
(lb) 
where/?, is the selling price of company I (ƒ = 1,2,3), 
Pi, is the structural price of company I and u is a 
random term. 
Companies have a price, pis, in mind which 
they consider to be appropriate in view of the struc-
tural demand. Actual prices deviate from that price 
only by a random term. Company ƒ does not change 
its selling price/), vis a vis changes in the purchase 
price/>,.,. This case of absent price coordination in 
the channel seems relevant only in stationary mar-
kets or when the price/?M is a minor part of total 
costs per unit of company I, for example, in case of 
substantial processing of agricultural products. How-
ever, in dynamic markets purchase prices might 
change substantially and companies might use the 
additional criterion: 
Pi-Pi-^m,, (lc) 
where m{ is the necessary contribution of p, to other 
variable costs and overhead per unit of product than 
/?,.,. In case of substantial price changes this condi-
tion will often not be fulfilled and company ƒ may 
now change its selling price in response to changes 
in the purchase price. 
'Routinized price coordination', systematic price 
coordination by companies in the channel on the 
basis of a routine procedure. 
Two situations can be distinguished: 
a) Companies apply the same 'markup' as a rou-
tine procedure; 
b) 'Follow the leader1 as a price coordination pro-
cedure. 
Ada. 
Company ƒ in the channel is using a specific markup 
as a routine procedure: 
Pi =APi-iJ,) , (2) 
where x, are other price-influencing factors. This 
routine procedure, for example/?; = a0 +_a, piA oxp, 
=_a_/>M, may have an economic basis, but cannot 
always considered to be a rational, optimizing proce-
dure. In markets with frequent, e.g. daily, price 
changes, transaction costs of economically effective 
pricing per transaction might be too high. For that 
reason, companies use a routine procedure, which 
has proven to be economically viable. Such a proce-
dure may be practised, for instance, by wholesalers 
and retailers in marketing channels of fresh produce. 
Adb 
Companies adapt prices to changes in prices of the 
channel leader: 
Pi=ÄPclrXi), (3) 
where pd is the price of the channel leader. For in-
stance, in consumer-oriented marketing channels big 
retailers or food industries may initiate a price 
change if consumer demand is decreasing or increas-
ing. Other companies in the channel will follow. 
'Rational price coordination', coordination of chan-
nel prices aiming at profit maximization. 
Also here two models can be distinguished: 
a) partially rational price coordination; 
b) fully rational price coordination. 
Ada 
Individual companies in the channel, but not the 
channel as a whole, adapt prices to changes in pur-
chase prices in order to maximize profit: 
Max n^ fo -c , - / ? ; . , ) ? , 
subject to 
\np3 = (l/ô)\nq + s, (ôp<-l) 
(4a) 
(4b) 
where II; is the profit of company I, q is the product 
flow through the channel and c, are the processing 
costs per unit faced by company /. The inverse de-
mand equation (4b) is assumed to be log-linear so 
the price elasticity of demand, ô ,^ is constant, s cap-
tures exogenous demand shifts. ü3 will be maxi-
mized if: 
dn3/âq=p3 + q(op3/dq)-c3-p2 = 0, (4c) 
leading to the following price equilibrium: 
A = (P2+c3)<y(i+ô> (4d) 
Subject to (4d) the first-order condition with respect 
to maximization of II2 gives 
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Pi =PM1 + ÔP) + ( V 2 - c3V(i + fy\ (4e) 
and finally, reminding that II, = (p, - c,)#, maximi-
zation of II, determines p3: 
From (4f) and (4b) q can be derived. 
(40 
The companies determine jointly the price of the 
final channel product such that profits are maxi-
mized. This implies: 
Max,nc=(pc-^=1c,)9 
subject to 
\npc = {\lbp)\nq + s, (Ô„<-1) 
(5a) 
(5b) 
where IIC is the profit of the whole channel and/?c is 
the price of the final channel product. The first-order 
condition of the profit maximization problem is: 
mc/a1 = pc+q($>c/âI)-YJlici=o 
, (5c) 
giving 
A = H C ' V ( I + * , ) (5d) 
Because ô^ < -1 , comparing (4f) with (5d) shows 
that/>c <p3 and hence, q will be greater at/»c than at 
p3 and so IIf will be greater than II, + II2 + II3 of the 
partially rational price coordination model. 
Equilibrium price relationships can be derived 
e.g. by assuming that companies 1 and 2 charge a 
two-part tariff (Tirole, 1988: 176): 
(5e) P,<1 = 4+Yj.icjV m 
From (5a) it follows that 
pr =U/q + Y ct 
Pc c H ^ , = , j ^
 ( 5 f ) 
so company 2 charges company 3 
P2=a2I\/q+q+c2=a2(pc-^cj)+cl+c2 
^ , (5g) 
with 0 < cc2 ^ 1, and, in turn, company 1 charges 
company 2 
p{ = a,a2IIc/ q + c, = a,(p2 - c, - c2) + c , , (5h) 
with 0 < a, < 1. From (5g) and (5h) it can be seen 
that company 2 takes a2 part of IIC away from com-
pany 3, while company 1 takes a, part of a ^ away 
from company 2. The companies have to agree upon 
feasible values of a, and a2. 
The proposed hierarchy from ' 'ad hoc'price 
coordination', 'routinizedprice coordination'to 'ra-
tional price coordination' suggests that the more 
rational companies are, the more price coordination 
is grounded on economic factors such as costs and 
price elasticity of demand. Nevertheless, except for 
the ad hoc price coordination situation, all price co-
ordination models in our hierarchy result in bivariate 
equilibrium (i.e., static or, similarly, long-run) price 
relationships. So what we have learnt from this theo-
retical section that only deals with static models, is 
that if empirical evidence is found of bivariate verti-
cal equilibrium price relationships between all prices 
in the chain, then the ad hoc price coordination 
model does not apply in the long run. In the short 
run all stages may be involved in trying to re-estab-
lish the price equilibria after an equilibrium error 
occurred, but there can also be one stage whose price 
does not show error-correcting behaviour. Therefore, 
although prices are in equilibrium in the long run, 
we do not know whether or not all stages are in-
volved in maintaining the long-run price relation-
ships. The stage that is not involved, might be con-
sidered to cause a bottleneck in price coordination, 
because its pricing strategy does not take the pricing 
interests of the other stages into account, which may, 
for example, hamper a joint marketing operation by 
the successive companies in the agricultural market-
ing channel vis a vis the consumer. 
As a consequence, in addition to studying the 
static price relationships, as e.g. in Larue (1991), we 
must also consider short-run price dynamics that 
show how these equilibrium price relationships are 
affected and reestablished after a price shock (inno-
vation) occurs in one of the channel stages. In the 
next sections this investigation will be carried out by 
vector error-correction modelling and applied to the 
Dutch pork production-marketing chain. The analy-
sis gives answer to the questions whether or not 
prices are coordinated in an ad hoc way and if not, 
which of the models, the routinized, the partially 
rational and the fully rational model, are consistent 
with the data and whether or not one of the stages 
does not make an effort to maintain price coordina-
tion within the marketing chain. 
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3. Method 
Let X, = (pll,...,pp,y be a vector of/? prices, 
wherep„ (7 = 1 ,...,p) is the output price of stage 7 in 
the marketing channel and/? > 2 is the total number 
of stages in the marketing channel in which stage 1 
is upstream and stage/? is downstream. 
If we assume that the time series of the x, and 
^variables in the routinized and rational price coor-
dination models, see Section 2, as well as the first 
differences ofpit, i.e., Apit (=/?„ -Pi,,.\), show a 
constant-mean or trend-reverting pattern, while the 
graph of the price series in levels, i.e.,/?,,, is charac-
terized by long periods of prices that are higher or 
lower than the average price level or overall linear 
trend regarding the whole period shown in the 
graph, then it is said that x:„ c„ and Ap;, are station-
ary, whereas pit is non-stationary. Because x„ and c„ 
are already stationary in levels while the /?„ series 
becomes stationary after taking first differences, it is 
said thatx,„ c„ and A/?„ are integrated of order zero, 
denoted 1(0), and/?,, is integrated of order one, de-
noted 7(1). 
7( 1 ) variables can be transformed to statio-
narity not only by taking first differences, but also by 
cointegration, i.e., by taking a certain (unique) linear 
combination of the /( 1 ) variables. Such a linear com-
bination represents a long-run equilibrium relation-
ship and the outcome of the linear combination dis-
plays the equilibrium error. Since 7(1) variables 
dominate 7(0) variables and because there can never 
be a relationship between an 7( 1 ) variable and an 7(0) 
variable, the routinized and rational price coordina-
tion models imply/? - 1 bivariate long-run equilib-
rium price relationships as follows: 
P//==ßo,,>l+ßl,,>l7?/-l,/+eM-l.<» (6) 
where 7= 2,...,/?, the ß's are parameters with ß M M > 
0, and e;M ,is 7(0) representing the short-run devia-
tions from the equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium er-
ror). A multivariate time-series model must be used 
to find evidence of (6) and to show how prices re-
spond if one of them causes a disequilibrium. In this 
study we employ Johansens's maximum likelihood 
(ML) procedure (Johansen, 1988, 1991 and 1995b; 
Johansen and Juselius, 1990,1994) for estimation of 
a vector error-correction model (VECM) of the 
prices. Clear introductions in cointegration and 
error-correction can be found in Charemza and 
Deadman (1992), Rao (1994), Enders (1995) and 
Harris (1995). 
Starting point of the Johansen procedure is a 
vector autoregressive model of order k, denoted 
VAR(Ä:), that can be rewritten as 
*x, =rarM +X^J^H
 +M+^t +e, '(7) 
where AX, = X, - X_,, u are the intercepts, P are 
centred seasonal dummies which sum to zero over a 
full year, e„...,er are 77AJ,(0,A) and X*+i,—»^ o are 
fixed. Suppose that X, is 7(1), then the coefficient 
matrix II contains information about the long-run 
price relationships. Consequently, if rank(II) = r 
with 0 <_/• < /?, then there are r long-run (i.e., 
cointegration) relationships and II can be expressed 
as the outer product of two (full column rank) (p x 
r) matrices a and ß: 
n = ccß\ (8) 
such that ß'X, is 7(0) in which case (7) is called a 
VECM. The columns of ß are called the 
cointegrating vectors and can be identified by impos-
ing restrictions as follows: 
ß = (77,(j>„...,77r(£), (9) 
where Hj (j = 1 ,...,r) is a (p*Sj) matrix reducing the 
/»-dimensional vector ß7 to the .^-dimensional vector 
(by with 1 < Sj </?. If [i can be restricted to be only 
included in the long-run price relationships, then the 
Xhl term in (7) is replaced by the (/?+l)-dimensional 
vector ip{n...,ppt, 1)' letting ßy and 77, to obtain (/?+l) 
rows. Then, in the case of the bivariate long-run 
price relationships in (6) (these relationships include 
two prices and an intercept, hence 5,= 3), before im-
posing the normalization restriction, the (j + l)th 
element of the first column (allowing for the coeffi-
cient of the price that will be the dependent variable 
after normalization), the (p + l)th element of the sec-
ond column (allowing for the intercept) and they'th 
element of the third column (allowing for the coeffi-
cient of the price that will be the right-hand-side 
variable after normalization) of 77, are equal to one 
while all the other elements of 77y are zero. 
To test for cointegration, trace statistics are 
used to determine r (Johansen and Juselius, 1990). 
Next, the system is checked for exact identification 
using the rank condition in Johansen ( 1995a) and the 
ML estimates of a and ß are computed by the 
switching algorithm outlined in Johansen and 
Juselius (1994). 
If prices are coordinated such that there are/? -
1 cointegrating vectors (i.e., r —p - 1 cannot be re-
jected whereas /•</?- 1 must be rejected), then we 
reject the ad hoc price coordination model in favour 
of the routinized and rational models. From the esti-
mates of ß further information can be obtained on 
which of the models, the routinized, the partially 
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rational and the fully rational model, are consistent 
with the data. Moreover, in spite of r = p - 1, there 
can still be one stage that does not join the other 
stages in their effort to keep prices in equilibrium. 
Such a stage could be causing a bottleneck in price 
coordination. To outline the testable features of a 
bottleneck stage in price coordination, attention must 
be focused on the error-correction mechanism in (7). 
For illustrative purposes, let us consider the case in 
which p = 2, k - 1 and r = 1 so that after imposing 
(6) along the lines of (8) and (9), we can write (7) in 
full as 
slaughterhouses (stage 3), which produce the pork; 
and lastly, the retailers (stage 4), who sell the pork to 
the consumers. Consequently, the dataset contains 
the piglet price, px (Dfl/piglet), the price of fattened 
pigs,/?2 (Dfl/100kg slaughter weight), the price in-
dex of pork at the slaughterhouse level, p3 (1985 = 
100), and the retail price of pork, pA (Dfl/kg lean 
meat). All prices are deflated by the Dutch consumer 
price index (1985 = 1.00). Our sample consists of 
monthly data from January 1989 up to and including 
May 1994 (65 observations). The data and their 
sources are available from the authors upon request. 
A/>„=cc,(Pz,-i -ßo. 
+ e 
ß.i/Vi) + H. + Table 1 VAR order determination 
M » 
Ap2l = a2(^2 M - p01 - ß„p, i M) + "2 + 
Z>»D> + €, 
(10a) 
(10b) 
where, for example, d= 12 in case of monthly data. 
If pZl.i is higher (smaller) than its long-run equilib-
rium level given by ß01 + ß xp lht, then Ap2,decreases 
(increases) given that -2 < a2 < 0, so that p2lchanges 
to eliminate the deviation from long-run equilibrium. 
Moreover, if -2 < -a,ß,, < 0, then/?„ is changing as 
well to eliminate the disequilibrium between both 
prices. However, if a, < 0 (a2 > 0), then the {p2l} ( 
{/>„} ) sequence does all the correction to eliminate 
any deviation from long-run equilibrium. In that 
case, stage 1 (stage 2) is considered to cause a bottle-
neck in price coordination. There is, however, one 
exception. If a, = 0 (a2 = 0), then stage 1 (stage 2) 
can be considered to be the channel price leader in-
stead of causing a bottleneck, see Hall and Milne 
(1994) on the definition of long-run causality. In 
general, if r = p - 1 and the rth row of a is a zero 
row, then stage /will be the channel price leader. If 
the Zth row of a is not a zero row, it depends on the 
elements of this row whether or not stage I is caus-
ing a bottleneck. This will be worked out in the next 
section where an empirical application is presented 
to illustrate the methodology in the general case, i.e., 
the case in which the marketing channel contains 
three or more stages. 
4. Application 
We consider the marketing channel of pork in 
the Netherlands, see, for example, Den Ouden et al. 
(1996). Four stages are distinguished (p = 4): the 
breeders (stage 1), who produce the piglets; the fat-
teners (stage 2), who produce the fattened pigs; the 
k 
FPE 
AIC 
HQ 
SC 
p-value 
LR(16) 
r 
p-value LR(1) 
0 
3802 
6.53 
6.53 
6.53 
0.00 
1 
34.64 
1.80 
2.02 
2.37 
0.07 
2 
0.79 
2 
33.11 
1.69 
2.14 
2.84 
0.65 
3 
0.96 
3 
42.74 
1.85 
2.52 
3.57 
0.92 
1 
0.54 
4 5 
64.13115.44 
2.11 2.48 
3.00 3.59 
4.40 5.52 
0.99 0.21 
0 0 
0.67 0.47 
First, the order of the VAR, k, is determined 
as well as the number of cointegrating vectors, r, see 
Table 1. Four information criteria are computed: 
FPE, AIC, HQ and SC, see Liitkepohl (1991). The 
estimate for k is chosen such that the criterion is 
minimized. FPE and AIC select k = 2, while HQ and 
SC estimate k = 1. However, at k = 1 the likelihood 
ratio test testing 16 restrictions, denoted LR(16), 
rejects VAR(l) against VAR(2) at the 10% level. 
Moreover, a VAR(2) complies with p - 1 = 3 
cointegrating vectors as selected by Johansen's trace 
statistic (see Table 2), where we use those 90% 
quantiles, denoted trace(90%), that comply with the 
Table 2 Cointegrating rank determination (k = 
r 0 1 2 
trace 71.93 39.01 19.42 
trace (90%) 49.65 32.00 17.85 
 2) 
3 
3.77 
7.52 
result that the LR(1) test (see Table 1) does not re-
ject the restriction according to which p is only in-
cluded in the cointegrating space (for the LR test 
concerning u, see Johansen and Juselius, 1990; the 
critical values are obtained from Table 1* in 
Osterwald-Lenum, 1992: 467). Based on these re-
sults we tentatively conclude that k = 2 and r = 3. 
The r =p - 1 = 3 result is in line with the rou-
tinized and rational price coordination models dis-
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cussed in Section 2. After normalization, the esti-
mated cointe-grating vectors lead to the following 
long-run equilibrium price relationships (/-values in 
parentheses are asymptotically ^(0,1) distributed): 
p2,= 55.98 + 2.13/7,, + ê2ll, 
(4.64) (1021) 
p„= 15.68 + 0 . 1 % +42, , 
(16.02) (35.33) 
p4l= 3.85 +0.05/73,+ ^43,. 
(12.95) (20.20) 
(11a) 
( l ib) 
( l ie ) 
All cointegrating parameter estimates are 
highly significant and have the correct sign. Hence, 
as far as this limited evidence goes, we conclude that 
channel companies do not exhibit 'ad hoc' price co-
ordination. In addition, the estimated parameters of 
the prices in ( 11 a)-( 11 c) can be used to check which 
of the models, the routinized, the partially rational 
and the fully rational model, are supported by the 
data. For this purpose, we first have to correct the 
parameter estimates for the measurement units of the 
prices. To compare the price of piglets (Dfl/piglet) 
with the price of pigs (Dfl/100kg slaughter weight), 
one must know that one fattened pig yields about 85 
kg slaughter weight. Consequently, the corrected 
estimate for the parameter of/?,, in (1 la) is found as 
ß12, = (85/100) x 2.13 = 1.81. Furthermore,/74;is the 
price of a kilogramme lean meat whi les is the price 
per 100 kg slaughter weight. The average lean-meat 
percentage is 55 percent. Thus, if we substitute (1 lb) 
in (lie), then we obtain the following for measure-
ment units corrected estimate of the parameter at-
tached to/72, in the equilibrium relationship between 
p4l and/72,: ß,42 = 55 x 0.05 x 0.19 = 0.52. 
In the fully rational price coordination model 
Pm = 1/«,, see (5h), and ß,42 = l/(o, rç ), as can be 
derived from generalising (5f)-(5h) to a four-stage 
channel. Since 0 < a., < 1 (/ = 1,2,3), it can be seen 
that the estimate of 1.81 for ß12, fits into this model. 
However, the estimate of 0.52 for ß,42 is clearly not 
in favour of the fully rational price coordination 
model. Consequently, we conclude that the fully ra-
tional price coordination model does not apply. 
In the partially rational price coordination 
model p121 = 0/(1 + ô„), see (4e), and ßl42 = [0/(1 + 
ô,,)]2, as can be derived from substituting (4e) in (4d) 
while generalising to a four-stage channel. Substitut-
ing the estimates of ß,2, and ßl42 we obtain 6^  = 
-2.23 from 1.81 = 0/(1 + ÔJ and § = 2.59 from 
0.52 = [0/(1 + àp)f. The second estimate of öpdoes 
not comply with the theory and hence, the partially 
rational price coordination model should also be re-
jected. 
So far, we checked all price coordination 
models in our hierarchy apart from the routinized 
model. Because all models being checked were re-
jected, our hierarchy allows only the routinized price 
coordination model to apply. If we take the sample 
average of the undeflated prices and adjust the inter-
cept terms in the long-run price relationships in 
( l la)-( l lc) accordingly (the undeflated average 
price is equal to 1.8 times the deflated one, so the 
intercept term in the long-run relationship between 
/72£nd/7„ becomes 1.8 x 55.98 = 101 and the inter-
cept term in the long-run relationship between p4l 
and/72, will be 1.8 x (3.85 + 0.05 x 15.68) = 8.34), 
we obtain the following markup rules:/72,= 101 + 
1.81/7,£nd/74,= 8.34 + 0.52p2r The sample average 
of the undeflated prices pltp2 and p4 are 117.5 guil-
ders per 100 kg slaughter weight, 315 guilders per 
100 kg slaughter weight (or 5.73 guilders per kg lean 
meat) and 11.35 guilders per kg lean meat, respec-
tively. Notice that these averages nicely comply with 
the markup rules and imply that in the long run a ten 
percent increase in/7, leads to a 6.8 percent increase 
in/72 which in turn leads to a 1.8 percent increase in 
p4, and a ten percent increase i n ß results in a 2.6 
percent increase 'mp4. 
Moreover, the result that the coefficient ofp2l 
in the markup rule/74, = 8.34 + 0.52p2l is smaller 
than one, implies that fluctuations in the buying 
pricep2, are dampened in the retail price, so that the 
absolute margin ip4,-p2i) fluctuates opposite to the 
buying pricep2l. This phenomenon, which is well-
known in the literature as a characteristic of'level-
ling', was also found by Van Dijk (1978: 166, 167) 
whose investigation of the relationship between re-
tail and wholesale prices of pork in The Netherlands, 
using quarterly data for the period 1961 - 1973, led 
to the conclusion that of a unit change in the whole-
sale price 72% is reflected in the retail price. Level-
ling policies in pricing by retailers may, for example, 
be evoked if consumer demand is more elastic at 
higher prices than at lower prices (a linear demand 
function has this property) so that the profit-maxi-
mizing retailers will vary absolute margins inversely 
with buying prices and price elasticity of demand, 
assuming the raw material is the main cost item for 
the retailer. See Van Dijk (1978) and the references 
cited therein. 
Next, to investigate whether or not one of the 
stages causes a bottleneck or behaves as a channel 
leader in price coordination, the parameters in the 
VECM are estimated conditional on the long-run 
parameter estimates in (1 la)-(l lc). Notice that it 
does not make any difference whether we include 
the set of error-correction terms given by (ê2,,.,, êv_,. 
\i e43./-l)> V^I2.M> ^I3.i-h eU.i-\)i \e2\.i-U ^23.1-1' eU.i-\h \e3l.i-
u «32./-I. <W,) or (4,_,_,, <!,_,.,, <f3.,., ) in the VECM. 
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Nevertheless, if we want to determine whether or not 
Pa (/= 1,...,4) shows error-correcting behaviour, it is 
most convenient to include the set in which the first 
index of each equilibrium error is given by I. 
Consequently, to test whether or not stage 1 
causes a bottleneck or behaves as a price leader, PA",. 
, is replaced by (êl2 ,_„ ên ,.„ êu,.,)' in (7). Next, the 
parameters in (7) are estimated by OLS and the vari-
able with statistically the most insignificant coeffi-
cient is deleted from the equation that included this 
coefficient (intercepts, however, are never deleted). 
The model is then reestimated using the method of 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Potentially, 
a parameter is again set to zero and this process is 
repeated until all of the regressors have significant 
coefficients (i.e., probability < 0.05). In this way, the 
following equation was found for A/>„ (standard er-
rors in parentheses, probabilities between brackets): 
Ap„ = -0.14 + 5.33D,, + 6.81A/>4,., + 0.50êl2M -
(0.56) (1.88) (2.53) ' (0.18) 
0.70(5,3,.,+ 0.23<?14 M + 
(0.15) ' (0.05) ' (12) 
T= 63 (89.03 - 94.05); R2 = 0.47;°" = 4.43; ARX-X 
F(X, 55) = 0.21 [0.65]; ARX-4 F(4, 49) = 0.62 
[0.65]; ARCHl-l F(X, 60) = 2.60 [0.11]; NORM 
X2(2) = 0.98 [0.32]; HETEROSC F(4, 53) = 0.45 
[0.77]; RESETX-3 F{3,54) = 0.07 [0.97]; BREAK92 
F(6, 51) = 1.80 [0.12]; FORCST94 F(5, 52) = 0.82 
[0.54], 
where rdenotes the number of observations, o is the 
standard deviation of the regression, ARl-I tests for 
the absence of ;th order autocorrelation, ARCHX-X 
tests for the absence of first order autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity, NORMis the Jarque-
Bera statistic that tests whether e, is normally dis-
tributed, HETEROSC tests for the absence of 
heteroscedasticity quadratic in regressors (no cross 
terms), RESETX-Itests for the absence of /th order 
RESET, BREAK92 is the Chow breakpoint statistic 
that tests for the absence of parameters whose values 
regarding the sample 89.03 -91.12 differ from their 
values regarding the sample 92.01 - 94.05, 
FORCST94 is the Chow forecast statistic that tests 
for the absence of parameters whose values regard-
ing the sample 89.03 - 93.12 do not apply for the 
sample 94.01 - 94.05. We refer to Kuiper (1994) or 
Hendry (1995) for more details. None of the diag-
nostic test statistics reveal model misspecification in 
(12). 
To see what the parameter estimates in (12) 
tell us about the question whether or not/?,, is error-
correcting, we have to consider the parameter esti-
mates of the error-correction terms ên,.x (=ƒ?,,., -
0.47/v, + 26.27), e?13,M (=/»,,M - 2.43/v, + 64.37) 
and êl4iM (=/»,,M - 49.30p4M + 253.97). These esti-
mates are 0.50, -0.70 and 0.23. Note that the sum of 
these estimates is almost equal to zero. If we test this 
restriction we obtain a x2(l) statistic of 0.08 imply-
ing a probability of 0.77. Hence, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the parameters of the error-cor-
rection terms in (12) sum to zero, leading to the con-
clusion thatp,,., is not included in the error-correc-
tion mechanism of the equation for Lpu. This im-
plies that if/?,, causes an equilibrium error, then the 
prices of the other stages must be called in to do the 
correction. Nevertheless, stage 1 is not the channel 
price leader, because if it had been the channel price 
leader, then the parameters of the error-correction 
terms in (12) would have been zero. Consequently, 
stage 1 causes a bottleneck in price coordination. 
Because r =p -1, there cannot be a bottleneck 
nor a price leader among the other stages in the 
channel. This is confirmed by the equations for 
A/>2„ Ap3„ and Ap4l that were found when applying 
model selection to (7) each time $Xhi was replaced 
by one of the vectors (<?2U.„ ê^,.,, ê24l.l)\ (ê,, ,.„ ê32(. 
1> e34,i-l) a r , d ( ^ 4 , , . , , ^42 j /-i , ^43,;-l) • 
Ap2l = -0.21 - 4.76A, + 5.20D6l + 2.16A/?3,., 
(1.15) (2.20) (2.21) (0.50) 
+ 6.63A/?4/., - 0.27<?2,,., - 0.57(?23,., 
(2.76) ' (0.05) ' (0.09) 
+ £2l , 
(13) 
T= 63 (89.03 - 94.05); R2 = 0.49; ^  = 9.57; ARX-X 
F(l , 54) = 0.01 [0.91]; ARXA F(4, 48) = 0.39 
[0.82]; ARCHX-X F(X, 60) = 0.02 [0.89]; NORM 
X2(2) = 2.36 [0.12]; HETEROSC F(4, 52) = 0.17 
[0.95]; RESETX-3 F(3, 53) = 2.83 [0.05]; BREAK92 
F(l, 49) = 1.21 [0.31 ]; FORCST94 F(5, 51 ) = 1.21 
[0.32], 
A/>3/ = -0.06 + 0.28A/?3/., -0.13<?3,,., + e* , (14) 
(0.24) (0.11) ' (0.05) 
T= 63 (89.03 - 94.05); R2 = 0.20; ^  = 1.86; ARX-X 
F(X, 58) = 0.37 [0.55]; ARX-4 F{4, 52) = 0.58 
[0.68]; ARCHX-X F(X, 60) = 0.00 [0.96]; NORM 
X2(2) = 3.23 [0.07]; HETEROSC F(2, 58) = 0.04 
[0.96]; RESETX-3 F(3, 57) = 1.22 [0.31]; BREAK92 
F(3, 57) = 0.98 [0.41]; FORCST94 F(5, 55) = 0.62 
[0.69], 
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A/74/ = -0.00 - 0.21 Du + 0.23£>4, + 0.17Z)6, + 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
0 .154,+ 0.164, -0.234» 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
-0.18D l w-0.58ê4 2 M^ £i 
(0.07) (0.08) ' 
+ °4/ (15) 
T= 63 (89.03 - 94.05); R2 = 0.65;°" = 0.15; AR\-\ 
F(\, 52) = 2.83 [0.10]; ARl-4 F(4, 46) = 0.33 
[0.85]; ARCH\-\ F(\, 60) = 0.17 [0.68]; NORM 
X2(2) = 5.22 [0.02]; HETEROSC F(\, 53) = 0.08 
[0.78]; RESETl-3 F(3, 51) = 0.57 [0.64]; BREAK92 
F(9,45) = 1.03 [0.43]; FORCSTÏ4, F(5, 49) = 1.04 
[0.40]. 
None of the diagnostic test statistics monitor 
serious misspecification (i.e., when several diagnos-
tic test statistics have a probability smaller than 0.05 
or when a single diagnostic test statistic has a proba-
bility smaller than 0.01). In each equation, (13), (14) 
and (15), the sum of the adjustment parameters lies 
between -2 and 0. Therefore, each of the prices, p2„ 
pit andp4l, is able to correct itself to eliminate the 
equilibrium error it caused. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we proposed a method for moni-
toring bottlenecks in price coordination within the 
production-marketing chain. Bottlenecks were de-
fined as impediments at a particular stage of the mar-
keting channel to adapt to price changes through the 
whole marketing channel of the respective product. 
We applied our method to analysing price coordina-
tion in the Dutch pork production-marketing chain. 
Starting with the upstream one, the following four 
stages were considered: the breeders (stage 1 ), who 
produce the piglets; the fatteners (stage 2), who pro-
duce the fattened pigs; the slaughterhouses (stage 3), 
which produce the pork; and lastly, the retailers 
(stage 4), who sell the pork to the consumers. The 
main conclusions are: 
The proposed framework and research meth-
odology seem to be a useful instrument for 
monitoring a bottleneck stage with respect to 
price coordination in agricultural marketing 
channels. The methodology seems to be in 
particular useful for products that are pro-
cessed to a minor extent in the channel, such 
as fresh products like pork. 
In the pork chain there are no structural bot-
tlenecks in price coordination, i.e., in the long 
run the output price in each stage forms an 
equilibrium relationship with each of the out-
put prices of the other stages. According to 
the equilibrium relationships we found that 
companies do not apply rational markup rules, 
which might leave room for improvement of 
coordination of channel prices aiming at profit 
maximization. 
None of the stages appear to be the price 
leader in the sense of driving the prices in the 
other stages in the long run. 
In the short run, breeders are found to cause a 
bottleneck in price coordination. If the price 
of piglets causes a deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium relationships with the prices of 
the downstream stages in the channel, then the 
breeders are not able to adapt the price of pig-
lets to eliminate the equilibrium error without 
forcing the downstream stages, including the 
retailers, to change their prices. However, if 
we take into account that a joint marketing 
operation through the marketing channel vis a 
vis the consumer is often needed in order to 
achieve competitive advantage over rivals, it 
will be much better if wholesalers or retailers 
are allowed to change prices to meet the needs 
and wants of the consumer without being 
bounded to adjust their own price to the prices 
in the upstream stages of the marketing chan-
nel. Consequently, by concluding that breed-
ers cause a bottleneck in price coordination 
through the chain, they can also be considered 
to hamper chain marketing. 
Our analysis of bottlenecks can be extended 
along the framework proposed in Section 2 by ana-
lysing the long-run equilibrium price relationships in 
more detail, by introducingfmore variables, such as 
competitive prices, and by allowing for more than 
one firm per stage of the marketing channel (see, for 
example, Choi, 1996, and Wohlgenant, 1989, and 
the references cited therein). All these extensions, 
however, ask for a further elaboration of demand 
and cost functions. 
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